Ruben Juarez, University of Hawaii

Incentive-compatibility with monetary punishment
mardi, 1 octobre 2019 - 11:30 am1:00 pm
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Personne-ressource: 
Vikram Manjunath
Courriel: 
vmanjuan@uottawa.ca
Téléphone: 
613-562-5800
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A mechanism chooses an allocation of resources and payments to agents based on their reported type. We describe the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms when a monetary punishment to intermediaries who misreport their type is possible. Ineffective punishment functions and optimal mechanisms are provided for the cases of endogeneous and exogeneous punishment functions, respectively. Our work expands previous characterizations of incentive-compatible mechanisms when punishment was not available. https://www.rubenj.net/