Bernard Fortin, Université Laval

Measuring Physicians’ Response to Incentives: Labour Supply, Multitasking, and Earnings
vendredi 29 novembre 2019 à 14 h 30 16 h 00
Lieu
Coordonnées
Personne-ressource: 
Myra Yazbeck
Courriel: 
myazbeck@uOttawa.ca
Téléphone: 
613-562-5800
Poste: 
1156
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Non
Frais de participation: 
Sans frais
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We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using matched administrative and time-use data on specialists from Qu´ebec (Canada). These physicians were paid fee-for-service contracts and supplied a number of different services. We model physician behaviour and derive a conditional earnings function, which returns the maximum labour-market earnings for a given number of hours worked. Le Chatelier effects imply that limited-information methods identify a lower bound to the own-price substitution effect of a price change. Full-information methods explain earnings and hours simultaneously. They identify the full response to incentives, including income effects. Our results suggest that the own-price substitution effects of a relative price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but are overridden when prices are increased for individual services. In contrast, in the presence of broad-based fee increases, the income effect dominates the substitution effect, which leads physicians to reduce their supply of services.