Ruben Juarez, University of Hawaii

Incentive-compatibility with monetary punishment
Tuesday 1 October 2019 à 11 h 30 to à 13 h 00
Location
Contact information
Contact person: 
Vikram Manjunath
Email: 
vmanjuan@uottawa.ca
Phone: 
613-562-5800
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Registration required: 
No
Cost to attend: 
Free of charge
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A mechanism chooses an allocation of resources and payments to agents based on their reported type. We describe the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms when a monetary punishment to intermediaries who misreport their type is possible. Ineffective punishment functions and optimal mechanisms are provided for the cases of endogeneous and exogeneous punishment functions, respectively. Our work expands previous characterizations of incentive-compatible mechanisms when punishment was not available. https://www.rubenj.net/